美전문가 "대북제재로는 부족, 김정은에 정치적 타격 입혀야"

2017/07/18 08:30

"비핵화 안 하면 체제 흔들겠다고 압박해야"

(워싱턴=연합뉴스) 강영두 특파원 = 미국 랜드연구소의 브루스 베넷 선임연구원은 17일(현지시간) 북한 핵·미사일 해법과 관련해 북한 체제 붕괴를 가속하는 수단을 동원해 김정은 노동당 위원장에게 압박을 가해야 한다고 주장했다.

한반도 안보 전문가인 베넷 선임연구원은 이날 미 의회에서 열린 '북한의 지속적인 위협' 토론회에서 "대북 제재만으로는 설득력이 떨어지는 만큼 새로운 대안을 찾을 필요가 있다"며 이같이 말했다.

그는 우선 비핵화에서 한걸음 물러선 이른바 '핵동결론'에 대해 1993년 1차 북핵 위기 이후 제네바 합의를 북한이 파기한 사실을 거론하며 반대했다.

베넷 연구원은 "북한은 우라늄 농축과 플루토늄 처리를 하지 않기로 합의문에 서명하고서도 이를 멈추지 않았다"며 "북한이 핵동결 합의를 해도 곧바로 되돌아갈 수 있다"고 말했다.

그는 "북한과의 협상은 매우 실용적이어야 한다"며 김정은 위원장에게 더욱 직접적이고 크나큰 정치적 손실을 낳을 수 있는 조치를 주문했다.

베넷 연구원은 "미국은 김정은에게 '당신이 우려하는 단 하나는 정권의 생존이라는 것을 우리는 알고 있다. 따라서 당신에게는 하나의 선택밖에 없다. 비핵화를 하지 않으면 정치적으로 체제를 동요시키는 조치를 하겠다'라고 분명히 말해야 한다"고 강조했다.

그는 일례로 "거액을 지급하고서라도 북한 군부의 핵심인사들을 한두 명이라도 남한으로 탈북시킨다면 김정은에게 상당한 정치적 타격이 된다"고 말했다.

북한의 군사 정보가 미국과 한국으로 흘러들어 감으로써 김정은 위원장이 격노하고, 북한 지도층이 동요하는 효과를 볼 수 있다고 그는 설명했다.

베넷 연구원은 "지금까지 시진핑 중국 국가주석은 한국과 8차례 정상회담을 했지만, 김정은과는 단 한 번도 하지 않았는데, 이는 북한 지도층에게 '북한은 중요하지 않으니 김정은은 상대할 필요가 없다'는 메시지를 주는 효과가 있다"며 "미국의 이 같은 조치도 동일한 효과를 낳을 수 있다"고 덧붙였다.

그는 "억지력은 의사 결정권자가 행동을 계속해 얻는 것보다 잃은 것이 더 많다고 여길 때 생긴다"며 "우리가 '레버리지'(지렛대)를 갖기 위해서는 이러한 조치가 필요하다"고 강조했다.

http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/nk/2017/07/18/4807080000AKR20170718031200071.HTML

A Surgical Strike Against North Korea? Not a Viable Option

North Korea's July 4 launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile that could hit American soil has renewed talk of military intervention, with the notion of a surgical strike on Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal once again gaining resonance. But an effective limited military strike with minimal collateral damage and no escalation simply won't work.

Despite recent statements by top Trump administration officials, there are no neat or efficient military solutions to the mounting threat posed by the regime of Kim Jong Un. A major stumbling block is that North Korea appears to have dozens of military bases with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and we likely don't know the precise locations of all of them.

A further significant complication is that nearly all of the North Korean bases are at least partly underground and have multiple entrances. Fully neutralizing their weaponry could take weeks of missile and air attacks by the U.S. and South Korea. Some of the facilities may be so deeply submerged that only nuclear force would destroy them.

Even if only one base is struck, the consequences could be catastrophic. North Korea has threatened large-scale retaliation for a single attack and South Korea would bear the brunt of its fury. North Korea has pointed thousands of artillery tubes and rocket launchers at South Korea and has vowed to turn the urbanized areas within range—with more than 20 million residents, including tens of thousands of U.S. citizens—into a “sea of fire.” With its chemical weapons, used with deadly efficiency on Kim's half-brother Kim Jong-Nam in February, the North could wreak unimaginable death and suffering on its enemies.

The scenario only worsens from there. If North Korea executes even a modest retaliation on South Korea, Seoul would be impelled to fire back, probably escalating the conflict into a major, protracted war that would involve much of the U.S. military. North Korea would likely lose, but not before it inflicts immense damage.

As U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis recently warned, North Korean retaliation would spur “probably the worst kind of fighting in most people's lifetimes.” Such a war is unlikely to end decisively and cleanly. It would probably transition to an insurgency that could exceed the U.S. experience in Iraq.

If the U.S. opts for a military response to North Korea's mounting aggressions, war would appear inevitable. So far, no American president has been willing to risk that outcome. President Trump, however, has conveyed his dissatisfaction with avoiding military options, tweeting recently that the “era of strategic patience with the North Korea regime has failed.” What steps he may be willing to make are unclear, but two days after Kim's July 4 fireworks Trump said he was considering “some pretty severe things.”

Left alone, North Korea will probably expand its nuclear force of 10 to 50 weapons today to 100 to 200 in the next decade or so. Simultaneously, North Korea's ICBM development apparently seeks to decouple U.S. security interests from those of its regional allies, South Korea and Japan. If the North succeeds, at some point it could issue South Korea an ultimatum to “surrender, or else.” The North may see such an approach as its best option for unifying Korea under North Korean control. The U.S. and South Korea should view such a prospect as a disaster, one which can be avoided only by reining in the North Korean nuclear weapon program now. Time is not on our side.

Convincing North Korea not to pursue such developments requires a U.S./South Korean approach in which the costs imposed exceed the benefits that Kim seeks (the essence of deterrence). The only thing the Kim regime values so highly is its own survival. The U.S. and South Korea could seek to prod Kim toward nuclear disarmament through intensified information operations targeting the North Korean public, particularly dissatisfied elites.

From my RAND research, based in part on extensive interviews with senior North Korean defectors, I have reason to hope that the impetus for such change could come from within if prompted and supported by U.S. and South Korean information operations.

Among North Korea's elite class—high-ranking diplomats, military officers, scientists and wealthy entrepreneurs—many would reportedly like to see Kim gone. These influential Northerners view Kim as a weak and ineffective leader, and those who are already capitalists regard him as a hindrance in their drive for Western-style economic rewards. My discussions with the defectors strongly suggest that many elites believe Kim's regime will probably collapse in the coming years. Given the right assurances through a robust information campaign, the North Korean elites might be emboldened to pursue regime change.

Defeating decades of North Korean indoctrination is itself a formidable challenge. After seven decades of North-South strife, war could still come. But a growing hunger for change among North Korean elites presents an opening that should not be overlooked. Their changing attitudes could help hasten Kim's tumble from power and pave the way for a more agreeable government to form. The alternatives are staggeringly grim.

https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/07/a-surgical-strike-against-north-korea-not-a-viable.html